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The U.S. Treasury Department now releases fuller information about its auctions than in the
past, including new information on investor class and bidder category. The investor class data
shed light on the distribution of demand for government securities, and the bidder category data,
released first, offer an early read on demand. Purchases by indirect bidders, in particular,
are a fairly good proxy for foreign purchases of Treasury notes, but not Treasury bills.
I
n recent years,the U.S.Treasury Department has
expanded the information it routinely releases
about purchases ofits securities at auction.It now
reportspurchases by bidder category after each auction and
discloses purchases by investor class with a shorter lag,and for
a broader group of securities,than in the past.The additional,
more timely data may be useful in understanding the per-
formance of individual securities.1A more direct application
of the data,however,is in understanding the distribution of
demand for government securities across investor groups.
Foreign official accounts,in particular,held $1.3 trillion
of Treasury securities at the end of 2005,or about 30 per-
cent of all marketable Treasury securities outstanding.2
The amount purchased by “indirect” bidders is often
assumed to be a proxy for purchases by foreign central
banks,and is sometimes used to draw inferences about
such banks’continued willingness to buy Treasury securi-
ties more generally.3
This edition of Current Issues describes the information
available on the buyers of U.S.Treasury securities at auction
and evaluates the extent to which the indirect bid is a good
proxy for purchases by foreign investors as a group—that is,
both foreign central banks and foreign private investors.The
article begins with a description of auction data and an
account of how disclosure has changed in recent years.
Summaries of the bidder category and investor class data
follow.The bidder category and investor class data are then
compared in order to illuminate the bidding methods used
by various investor classes and to assess how well the indi-
rect bid explains purchases by foreign investors.
The analysis reveals that the indirect bid is a fairly good
proxy for foreign purchases of Treasury notes (securities
with original maturities of more than one, but not more
than ten years),but not Treasury bills (securities with origi-
nal maturities of one year or less).The indirect bid is an
imperfect proxy for foreign purchases of Treasury securities
because other investors also bid indirectly.For bills,in par-
ticular,differences in the indirect bid across auctions are
driven more by variation in investment fund purchases than
by variation in foreign investor purchases.
Publicly Available U.S.Treasury Security Auction Data 
The Treasury Department releases data on its auctions
through a number of announcements and disclosures.In
advance of an auction,a press release provides details of an
offering,including the offering amount and the term and
type of security being offered.The announcement also dis-
closes the quantity of securities that the Federal Reserve
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ceeds might be reinvested in the new security.In addition,the
announcement reveals the amount of the new security that
investors in TreasuryDirect are scheduled to purchase.4
Auction participants bid competitively or noncompeti-
tively.Competitive bidders indicate the minimum yield they
are willing to accept for a specified quantity of securities.
Noncompetitive bidders specify the quantity ofsecurities they
are willing to buy at whatever price is paid by successful com-
petitive bidders.All noncompetitive bids are accepted (subject
to quantity limits). Competitive bids are then accepted in
order of increasing yield until the offering amount is covered.
All successful bidders pay the same price,computed from the
highest accepted yield.
Within minutes of the auction deadline, the Treasury
releases the auction results,including the highest accepted
yield, the associated price, and, for notes and bonds, the
coupon rate ofthe new security.Also announced are the quan-
tity of securities awarded to the Fed,the quantity awarded to
foreign and international monetary authorities for noncom-
petitive bids made through the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, and the quantity awarded to other noncompetitive
bidders.In addition,the Treasury discloses the quantity of
securities awarded to investors in TreasuryDirect.
Also within minutes of the auction close, the Treasury
releases a post-auction addendum with information on com-
petitive bids and awards by bidder category.This announce-
ment discloses the quantity of securities that primary dealers,
other direct bidders,and indirect bidders have bid for,as well
as the quantity of securities awarded to each of these groups.
Primary dealers are institutions that have a trading relation-
ship with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; other direct
bidders are financial institutions that place their bids directly
with the Treasury.Indirect bidders are bidders that place their
bids through direct submitters; this group includes foreign
and international monetary authorities that place their bids
through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The next release of data occurs on the seventh business day
of the month following each auction.At that time,the Treasury
discloses information on the purchases of its securities by
investor class.The reported classes are Federal Reserve Banks,
depository institutions (including banks),individuals (includ-
ing partnerships and personal trust accounts), dealers and
brokers,private pension and retirement funds and insurance
companies, investment funds, foreign and international
investors,and “other”investors.
Recent Changes in Data Release Practices
Some of the information released by the Treasury is rela-
tively new.The post-auction addendum was introduced by
the Treasury in May 2003 “to improve the transparency and
performance” of its auctions.5 The bidder category data
included in this addendum are often mentioned in auction
commentary because they are thought to provide an early
indication of a security’s buyers.In particular,the proportion
of securities sold to indirect bidders is commonly cited as a
proxy for purchases by foreign central banks.6
Additional changes were introduced in May 2005.7 Until
then,the Treasury only released investor class allotment data
for coupon securities and only on a quarterly basis in its
Treasury Bulletin publication. In May 2005, the Treasury
switched to a monthly release schedule,expanded the securi-
ties covered to include bills,and released a history of the bill
data going back to August 2001.
Limitations of the Auction Data
Although the Treasury now releases more auction data than in
the past, the information available about the ownership of
specific securities remains limited.The bidder category and
investor class data reveal only the allocation of securities at
auction.However,the ownership structure of issues can and
does change markedly over securities’ life cycles. Primary
dealers,in particular,buy large quantities of securities at auc-
tion and then sell them in the secondary market. Some of
these securities are sold after a security is issued; others are
sold before issuance in the so-called when-issued market.
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1Jordan and Jordan (1997) show that the share of an issue bought by dealers is
related to an issue’s future borrowing costs and that expected future borrowing
costs are capitalized into prices.
2These holdings are understated to the extent that such accounts buy and hold
securities indirectly through a foreign broker.Foreign investors as a whole held
$2.2 trillion in Treasury securities as ofthe same date.Foreign ownership data are
from the U.S.Department of the Treasury (<http://www.treas.gov/tic>) and
described in Sobol (1998).Marketable Treasury debt outstanding,$4.2 trillion as
of the end of 2005,is from the Treasury’s Monthly Statement of the Public Debt
(<http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdhisms.htm>).
3For example,weak participation by indirect bidders at an August 2005 five-year-
note auction “raised concerns that foreign central banks may be losing interest in
U.S.government securities”(“Treasury Prices Wilt as Auction Bidding Raises
Some Concern,”Wall Street Journal Europe,August 11,2005,p.M3).
4TreasuryDirect is a proprietary Treasury book-entry system for retail investors
who buy securities at auction and typically hold them to maturity.The system
operates in tandem with the commercial book-entry system used by dealers,
depository institutions,and other institutional investors.Garbade and Ingber
(2005) describe these systems and the Treasury auction process more generally.
5May 2003 Quarterly Refunding Statement ofAssistant Secretary for Financial
Markets Brian C. Roseboro, April 30, 2003 (<http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/js223.htm>).
6See,for example,“Foreign Central Banks May Have Aided 5-Yr Treasury Sale,”
Shayna Stoyko,Dow Jones Newswires,June 8,2005.
7See May 2005 Quarterly Refunding Statement ofAssistant Secretary for Financial
Markets Timothy S.Bitsberger,May 4,2005 (<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
js2420.htm>).www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
Despite these limitations,the auction data remain the sole
source of information on the ownership of particular Treasury
issues.In addition,although an issue’s ownership can change
over time,the allocation of an issue at auction sheds some
light on an issue’s future borrowing costs and presumably
value (Jordan and Jordan 1997).Moreover,the fact that the
bidder category data come out promptly—weeks before the
investor class data—explains why they are monitored for
ownership information.
What the Bidder Category Data Show
The bidder category data show that primary dealers alone
account for 70.9 percent of Treasury securities sold to 
the public,on average (Table 1).8 Direct bidders other than
primary dealers buy 2.4 percent,and indirect bidders buy
21.6 percent.The average purchase share of noncompetitive
bidders is 5.1 percent.The large share of securities bought
by primary dealers is notable given that there are only
twenty-two of these institutions, whereas more than 800
financial institutions are set up to bid directly in Treasury
auctions.9
Purchase shares by bidder category vary significantly across
auctions.Primary dealers have bought as little as 33.6 percent
of an issue in recent years and as much as 100 percent.Other
direct bidders have bought as much as 31.6 percent ofan issue
competitively,and indirect bidders have bought as much as
64.8 percent.
Security type alone can explain much of the variation in
bidder category purchase shares (Table 2).Dealer shares are
higher for bills (73.7 percent) than for both nominal and infla-
tion-protected notes and bonds,and higher for nominal notes
and bonds (60.2 percent) than for inflation-protected securi-
ties (53.5 percent).Relatively high dealer participation at bill
auctions likely reflects other investors’lack of interest in very
short-term bills.Conversely,relatively low dealer participation
at auctions of inflation-protected securities may reflect the
limited use of these securities as hedging and trading instru-
ments (Sack and Elsasser 2004).
Bidder category shares also vary across issues of particular
maturities,most notably for bills (Chart 1).Dealer shares for
bills decline with issue maturity from 93.1 percent for cash man-
agement bills,to 84.7 percent for four-week bills,66.3 percent
for thirteen-week bills,and 63.1 percent for twenty-six-week
bills.The miniscule noncompetitive shares for cash manage-
ment and four-week bills are at least partly explained by auction
rules that prohibit TreasuryDirect investors from buying cash
management bills and,until October 2005,four-week bills.
The small indirect bidder shares for cash management and
four-week bills may simply reflect certain investors’lack of
interest in these securities because of their short maturities,
high issue-size variation and,in the case of cash management
bills,irregular issuance schedule.
What the Investor Class Data Show
The investor class data show that dealers and brokers alone
account for 75.4 percent of Treasury securities sold to 
the public,on average (Table 3).Foreign and international
investors account for the next largest share,12.5 percent,fol-
lowed by investment funds (6.5 percent),depository institutions
(0.5 percent),individuals (0.5 percent),and private pension
and retirement funds and insurance companies (0.0 percent).
“Other”investors, not captured in any of the classes cited,
accounted for 4.6 percent of the Treasury securities sold to the
public.10 Again, there is significant variation in purchase
shares across auctions,with depository institutions buying as
8Our analysis excludes amounts sold to the Federal Reserve.Amounts awarded to
the Fed are made in addition to the public offering amount.Based on total issue
sizes,the Fed bought an average of 19.1 percent of all 904 Treasury securities
auctioned between July 30,2001,and December 28,2005.Fed purchases of
bills,nominal coupon securities,and inflation-protected securities averaged
21.3 percent,12.7 percent,and 1.8 percent,respectively.
9The number ofprimary dealers changes over time.A current list is posted on the
New York Fed’s website at <http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers
_current.html>.On April 22,2004,Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Brian
C.Roseboro stated that there were 825 investors making use ofthe auction system
that allows direct bidding (<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1454.htm>).
Table 1
Bidder Category Purchase Shares for All Treasury Securities
Category Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Primary dealer 70.9 14.6 33.6 100.0
Direct bidder 2.4 3.6 0.0 31.6
Indirect bidder 21.6 12.7 0.0 64.8
Noncompetitive 5.1 4.7 0.0 16.8
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from the U.S.Treasury Department.
Note:The table reports descriptive statistics of bidder category purchase shares in
percent for all 576 U.S.Treasury security auctions between May 5,2003,and
December 28,2005.
Table 2
Bidder Category Purchase Shares by Security Type
Nominal Treasury  Treasury Inflation-
Treasury Bills  Notes and Bonds Protected Securities
Category (n=466) (n=94) (n=16)
Primary dealer 73.7 60.2 53.5
Direct bidder 2.5 1.9 0.5
Indirect bidder 17.9 36.0 44.7
Noncompetitive 5.9 2.0 1.3
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from the U.S.Treasury Department.
Note:The table reports average bidder category purchase shares in percent by
security type for all 576 U.S.Treasury security auctions between May 5,2003,and
December 28,2005.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1
much as 31.6 percent of an issue,investment funds buying
46.1 percent of an issue, and foreign and international
investors buying 38.6 percent of an issue.
Security type can explain much of the variation in investor
class purchase shares across auctions—just as it explained the
variation in bidder category purchase shares (Table 4).The pat-
tern for dealers and brokers follows the pattern for primary
dealers described earlier,as might be expected.Dealers and
brokers’smaller share of nominal note and bond purchases rel-
ative to bill purchases is essentially offset by higher nominal note
and bond shares for investment funds and foreign and interna-
tional investors.In contrast,both dealers and brokers and for-
eign and international investors purchase smaller shares of
inflation-protected securities than of nominal notes and bonds,
with investment funds making up nearly all the difference.
Investor class shares across issues are also revealing
(Chart 2). On average, foreign and international investors
account for roughly equal shares (20 to 24 percent) of issues
with maturities between twenty-six weeks and five years,
smaller shares (about 15 percent) of shorter and longer term
securities (that is,thirteen-week bills and ten-year notes),and
only tiny shares (less than 1 percent) ofcash management and
four-week bills.In contrast,investment fund shares tend to
increase with maturity,with an average of 3.2 percent for cash
management bills and 13.7 percent for ten-year notes.
Bidding Methods Used by the Various Investor Classes
A comparison of the bidder category and investor class data
sheds light on the bidding methods used by the various
investor classes. An understanding of different investors’
bidding methods, in turn, provides useful background for
efforts to estimate foreign purchases from the indirect bid.
Regressions of bidder category purchase shares on investor
class allotment shares suggest the share of purchases made by
bid type for each investor class.Further analysis ofthe auction
data reveals instances where investor classes must have made
at least some purchases by means of a particular bidding
method,because the amount purchased by the class or classes
exceeds the amount sold through other methods.11
Results of Regression Analysis
Regressions of direct bidder purchase shares on investor 
class allotment shares show that depository institutions and
4
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the U.S. Treasury Department.
Note: The chart plots average bidder category purchase shares by issue type for U.S. 
Treasury security auctions (excluding auctions of inflation-protected securities) 
between May 5, 2003, and December 28, 2005. 
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10For Treasury bills,the “other”category includes all noncompetitive bids except
those of the Federal Reserve and foreign and international monetary authorities.
This categorization biases downward the allotment share for the other classes to the
extent that noncompetitive bids are made by those classes.
Table 3
Investor Class Allotment Shares for All Treasury Securities
Class Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Depository institutions  0.5 2.6 0.0 31.6
Individuals 0.5 1.2 0.0 16.3
Dealers and brokers 75.4 14.6 34.5 100.0
Private pension
and retirement funds
and insurance companies 0.0 0.4 0.0 8.5
Investment funds  6.5 7.6 0.0 46.1
Foreign and international  12.5 9.7 0.0 38.6
Other 4.6 4.2 0.0 20.3
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from the U.S.Treasury Department.
Note:The table reports descriptive statistics of investor class allotment shares in
percent for 903 U.S.Treasury security auctions between July 30,2001,and
December 28,2005.
Table 4
Investor Class Allotment Shares by Security Type
Nominal Treasury  Treasury Inflation-
Treasury Bills  Notes and Bonds Protected Securities
Category (n=751) (n=131) (n=21)
Depository institutions  0.4 1.2 0.9
Individuals 0.1 2.3 2.7
Dealers and brokers 78.0 63.6 56.3
Private pension
and retirement funds
and insurance companies 0.0 0.1 1.3
Investment funds 4.9 11.5 30.2
Foreign and international  11.1 21.1 8.2
Other 5.5 0.3 0.3
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from the U.S.Treasury Department.
Notes:The table reports average investor class allotment shares in percent by security
type for 903 U.S.Treasury security auctions between July 30,2001,and December 28,
2005.For Treasury bills,the “other”category includes all noncompetitive bids except
those of the Federal Reserve and foreign and international monetary authorities.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 5
dealers and brokers (other than primary dealers) bid directly
(Table 5).12 The coefficients reported in the table can be 
interpreted asshares,so that 93 percent of depository institu-
tion purchases and 48 percent of dealer and broker purchases
are estimated to come from direct bids.13 No other investor
class coefficients are significantly different from zero.
Regressions of indirect bidder purchase shares on investor
class allotment shares show that dealers and brokers,private
pension and retirement funds and insurance companies (here-
after,pension funds),investment funds,and foreign and inter-
national investors bid indirectly.The coefficients suggest that
half of dealer and broker purchases and nearly all purchases of
pension funds,investment funds,and foreign and interna-
tional investors come from indirect bids.(At most 100 percent
of an investor class’s purchases can come through a particular
bidding method. The 1.86 coefficient for pension funds is
insignificantly different from one.)
Lastly,regressions of noncompetitive purchase shares on
investor class allotment shares show that individuals,foreign
and international investors,and “other”investors bid non-
competitively. The coefficients suggest that about half of
individual purchases,a small fraction of foreign and inter-
national purchases,and most purchases by “other”investors
come from noncompetitive bids.
The results are generally similar when estimated separately
for bills and coupon securities.For bills,however,the coeffi-
cient for pension funds is insignificant for bidding indirectly
11Primary dealers are excluded from this analysis because they are known to
make direct,competitive bids and because their purchases can be separated
out from the rest of the data.Primary dealer purchases are reported in their
own bidder category and they are a subset of dealer and broker purchases in
the investor class data. Dealers and brokers other than primary dealers
account for 3.9 percent of Treasury securities sold to the public,on average.
Noncompetitive purchases of foreign and international monetary authorities
made through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are also excluded from the
analysis.The bidding method is known in these cases and the amounts can be
separated out from the rest of the data since they are reported in the announce-
ments of auction results.On average,noncompetitive purchases by foreign and
international monetary authorities account for 9.8 percent of noncompetitive
purchases (when both are not zero) and 6.5 percent ofpurchases by foreign and inter-
national investors (when both are not zero).Most U.S.Treasury securities owned by
foreign investors are in fact held by foreign central banks,yet only 6.5 percent of
foreigners’securities purchases are noncompetitive purchases through the Fed.
Foreign central banks can also purchase Treasury securities by means ofcompet-
itive bids placed through dealers and the Fed.
12The regression analysis has one less observation than the descriptive bidder
category analysis because investor class allotment data are missing for the
cash management bill auctioned December 7,2005.
13Given that all possible bidding methods are being considered,one might expect
the coefficients for any given investor class to sum to about one.The fact that they
sum to one almost exactly without being explicitly constrained to do so is no
coincidence,but a necessary statistical outcome of the manner in which the
analysis is conducted.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the U.S. Treasury Department.
Note: The chart plots average investor class allotment shares by issue type for U.S. 
Treasury security auctions (excluding auctions of inflation-protected securities) 
between July 30, 2001, and December 28, 2005. 
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Results of Regressions of Bidder Category Purchase Shares
on Investor Class Allotment Shares
Bidder Category
Investor Class Direct Bidders Indirect Bidders Noncompetitive
Depository institutions  0.93** 0.08 -0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.01)
Individuals 0.15 0.30 0.54**
(0.21) (0.25) (0.13)
Dealers and brokers




and insurance companies -0.74 1.86** -0.13
(0.48) (0.60) (0.21)
Investment funds  0.03 0.99** -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Foreign and international -0.02 0.97** 0.04*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Other 0.04 0.11 0.85**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
R2 (adjusted) 0.54 0.96 0.92
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from the U.S.Treasury Department.
Notes:The table reports results of regressions of bidder category purchase shares on
investor class allotment shares for 575 U.S.Treasury security auctions between May
5,2003,and December 28,2005.Coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity-
consistent (White) standard errors in parentheses.Foreign and international and
noncompetitive variables exclude noncompetitive purchases of foreign and inter-
national monetary authorities made through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
*Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 13, NUMBER 1
and the coefficients for individuals and foreign and international
investors are insignificant for bidding noncompetitively.For
notes and bonds, the coefficient for dealers and brokers is
insignificant for bidding directly (and close to one for bidding
indirectly) and the coefficient for “other”investors is signifi-
cant for indirect but not noncompetitive bids.14
Additional Results from Analyzing Auction Data
Consistent with the regression results,further analysis of the
auction data reveals several instances when depository insti-
tutions must have bought securities directly and numerous
instances when dealers and brokers (other than primary deal-
ers) must have bought securities directly.The analysis does
not reveal any instances when any other particular investor
class must have bought securities directly,but it does reveal
many instances when some other investor class or classes
must have bought securities directly. In a few of these
instances,the direct purchasers must have included invest-
ment funds and/or foreign and international investors.15
In contrast to the direct bidder results,there are multiple
instances when each of the investor classes must have bought
securities indirectly.This includes those investor classes for
which the indirect bidder coefficient is insignificant.That is,
depository institutions, individuals, and “other” investors
bought securities indirectly in at least some auctions, even
though the regression results fail to indicate significant indirect
purchases by these classes.There are no instances when any
particular investor class must have bought securities noncom-
petitively (excluding the reported noncompetitive purchases
of foreign and international monetary authorities).
How Well Does the Indirect Bid Explain the Foreign
and International Allotment?
Another way to analyze the data is to explore the extent to which
differences in bidder category purchases across auctions can
explain differences in investor class allotments. Such an
approach would seem to offer a means of testing the common
view that purchases by indirect bidders are good proxies for
purchases by foreign central banks.However,the data do not
allow a test of this particular relationship,because information
is lacking on foreign central bank purchases ofTreasury securi-
ties at auction (aside from the noncompetitive purchases made
through the Fed).Nevertheless,the data do allow a test of how
well indirect bids explain purchases by foreign and interna-
tional investors as a whole.
While all investor classes bid indirectly to a certain extent,
the earlier results can be used to show that foreign and inter-
national investors account for the largest share of purchases
by indirect bidders (averaging 46 percent),followed by invest-
ment funds (32 percent),dealers and brokers other than primary
dealers (18 percent),and remaining investor classes combined
(4 percent).16 Average allocations vary substantially across
issues,however,so that foreign and international investors
account for only about 2 percent of cash management bills
purchased indirectly,but 74 percent of twenty-six-week bills
purchased indirectly (Chart 3).
Regressions of foreign and international allotment shares
on indirect bidder purchase shares show that the indirect bid
does indeed proxy for foreign and international purchases and
in the expected way (Table 6).For the two-year note,for example,
the average share allotted to foreign and international investors
is estimated as 8 percent of the issue plus 50 percent of the
indirect bid.The R2—a measure of the variance explained by
the statistical analysis—suggests that for the two-year note,
6
16Fitted estimates of the share of securities purchased indirectly by each
investor class are first calculated for each auction from the results of regres-
sions of indirect bidder purchase shares on investor class allotment shares
(run separately for bills and coupon securities).The fitted estimates are then
divided by the sum of the fitted estimates across investor classes to create
shares as a percent of indirect bidder purchases. Statistics based on these
shares are equal-weighted (as are all statistics throughout the article),so that
each auction receives the same weight in the analysis regardless of issue size.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the U.S. Treasury Department.
Note: The chart plots the average estimated breakdown of indirect bidder purchases 
by issue type for U.S. Treasury security auctions (excluding auctions of inflation-
protected securities) between May 5, 2003, and December 28, 2005. 
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14Many of the differences in results between bills and coupon securities can be
explained by the fact that noncompetitive purchases of bills are generally
reported in the “other”category.
15In an extreme example,direct bidders bought $5.25 billion of the two-year note
auctioned May 25,2005.Dealers and brokers (other than primary dealers) and
depository institutions together bought $144 million of the issue,investment
funds bought $7.325 billion,foreign and international investors $5.585 billion,
and “all other”investor classes (excluding primary dealers) $947 million.48 percent of the variation in foreign and international pur-
chases is explained by variation in the indirect bid.
The regressions also reveal significant differences across
issues in the extent to which indirect bidder purchases can
explain foreign and international allotments.In particular,the
R2 measures are much higher for notes than for bills.Variation
in the indirect bid across auctions thus explains 75 percent of
the variation in ten-year-note purchases,but only 16 percent of
the variation in thirteen-week-bill purchases.
The low R2s for the thirteen- and twenty-six-week bills in
particular are somewhat surprising as foreign and international
purchases of these securities are quite large.Nonetheless,while
the average level offoreign and international purchases ofthese
bills is high,the variation in such purchases is low when com-
pared with investment funds’purchases (the funds also buy
nearly all of their securities indirectly).17As a result,variation
in the indirect bid for bills is determined to a greater extent by
investment fund purchases.Put another way,the indirect bid for
bills is a better proxy for investment fund purchases than it is
for purchases by foreign and international investors.
Conclusion
Steps to increase the transparency of U.S.Treasury auctions in
recent years have provided useful information to market
observers.Investor class allotment information—shown to be
related to the performance of individual securities—is now
available on a more timely basis and for more securities than
in the past.In addition,bidder category data are now avail-
able,and their prompt release offers observers an early read
on the allocation of securities.The indirect bid,in particular,
seems to be a fairly good proxy for foreign purchases of
Treasury notes,although not Treasury bills.
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Table 6
Results of Regressions of Foreign and International Allotment Shares on Indirect Bidder Category Shares
Issue Type
Cash Mgmt.Bill 4-Week Bill 13-Week Bill 26-Week Bill 2-Year Note 3-Year Note 5-Year Note 10-Year Note
Constant -0.00* -0.00* 0.11** 0.14** 0.08* 0.01 0.09* -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Indirect bid 0.05* 0.08** 0.17** 0.21** 0.50** 0.60** 0.39** 0.65**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
R2 (adjusted) 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.18 0.48 0.60 0.29 0.75
Number of observations 48 139 139 139 31 11 31 21
Source:Author’s calculations,based on data from the U.S.Treasury Department.
Notes:The table reports results of regressions of foreign and international allotment shares on indirect bidder category shares for U.S.Treasury security auctions (excluding
auctions of inflation-protected securities) between May 5,2003,and December 28,2005.Coefficients are reported with heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) standard errors in
parentheses.The foreign and international variable excludes noncompetitive bids of foreign and international monetary authorities.
*Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level.